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COMMENT
SOUND RECORDINGS: COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACTUAL
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of recording artists have experienced wild success
in the United States, only to find that their style of music became
obsolete within a short period of time.1 When this occurs, record
labels routinely refuse to exercise contract options on the artists
and drop them from the label's roster. In response, many artists
look at international markets as sources of income. They have
started to exploit foreign markets such as Europe and Japan,
where music genres that are considered dated in the United States
remain a viable business.
2
Conducting business in foreign markets means different
expectations in terms of copyrights and contractual rights for the
artists' sound recordings. This Comment analyzes the differences
between Japan and the United States in this regard, and predicts
that many of the points that are so carefully negotiated in U.S.
recording contracts will increasingly become the source of
arbitration and/or litigation in Japan.
Part II of this Comment gives the background on some of the
different copyright treaties to which the United States and Japan
are signatories. Part III will discuss how the United States has
incorporated its philosophy on sound recordings into the current
1976 Copyright Act. Part IV explores the Japanese copyright
philosophy and different legislative measures that have burdened
recording artists and their record labels. Part V examines the
1. For example, the punk, grunge and heavy metal genres have recently been
usurped by genres like hip-hop, R & B, and alternative, especially those with female
singers (i.e., Sarah McLaughlin, Alanis Morissette, and Garbage).
2. See Carla Hay, Local Artists and Foreign Licensing, MUSIC CONNECrION, Sept.
26, 1994, at 24. "If you're not exactly the status quo or if you have a sound that's not
popular in the U.S., you can probably find another country that will welcome your style of
music." Id.
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barriers to litigation in Japan and some of the troubling aspects of
Japanese recording agreements that have resulted in arbitration
and litigation. This Comment also suggests U.S. and Japanese
legislative reform. Furthermore, different methods that parties to
a Japanese recording contract can use to avoid contractual
disputes will be delineated. Use of such preventative measures
will maintain the relatively stable status quo and placate the
Japanese society's aversion 3 to settling differences in court.
II. COPYRIGHT TREATIES
A. The Berne Convention and the Geneva Phonograms
Convention
Only recently had the United States become a signature
member to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"). 4 Japan, however,
ratified the Convention almost 100 years ago, in 1899.5 The
purpose of the Convention was to "constitute a Union for the
protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works," 6 which includes musical works.7  The goal of the
Convention was to promote predictability and provide a minimal
guarantee of artistic rights, especially for foreign authors in each of
the member nations.
8
3. As Part V shows, however, this "aversion" to litigation could be more a product
of the Japanese legal system itself than just cultural preferences alone.
4. See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC
340 (1995). The United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988, effective March 1,
1989, almost 100 years after its inception. See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 32-40 (1988).
5. See Mark S. Lee, Japan's Approach to Copyright Protection For Computer
Software, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 675, 678 (1994).
6. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Comp. 3 Copyright Laws and
Treaties of the World, Berne Copyright Union: Art. 1 (Paris Text,1971), reprinted in
ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 385 (4th
ed. Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
7. See id. art. 2(1).
8. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 12.2, at 372 (2d
ed. 1995). This paper does not discuss the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC)
because both the United States and Japan are now members of the Berne Convention,
which has effectively superceded the UCC. The UCC remains an important treaty
between the United States and those countries that signed the UCC, but not the Berne
Convention. The Soviet Union is one example of such a country. See id. §§ 12.2-12.3.
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The goal of predictability was undermined, however, because
the treaty left many decisions to the individual countries regarding
the scope of copyrights, especially copyrights that pertain to
musical works. The Convention states, "[elach country of the
Union may impose for itself reservations and conditions on the
exclusive right granted to the author of a musical work." 9
Interestingly, the Berne Convention did not cover sound
recordings of the musical work because "many countries other
than the United States [did] not believe that the making of a sound
recording comprehended sufficient originality of authorship... to
qualify for copyright protection."'
1
Instead, a separate treaty, the Geneva Phonograms
Convention, 11 allows its members to reciprocally protect sound
recordings from production or importation of unauthorized
recordings distributed to the public.12 To achieve this result, the
United States and Japan, both members of the convention, 13 have
enacted different limitations on sound recordings consistent with
their domestic laws and social philosophies towards copyrights.
14
There are numerous reasons why it took so long for the
United States to enter the Berne Union. The primary reason was
that before the implementation of the Convention, many of
9. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 13(1). At this point, it would be helpful to
distinguish between a musical work and a sound recording. A "musical work" is the
instrumental and vocal melodies contained in a musical composition as well as the
accompanying words. A "sound recording" is the work that results from the fixation of
these underlying sounds in one particular instance, (i.e., a completed recording session)
and are usually embodied in mediums such as compact discs and CD-ROMs, tapes, or
vinyl (or collectively, "phonorecords" as discussed infra.) See The Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998). If you were to look on a phonorecord, the musical work's
copyright (and also the graphical artwork such as album design and printed lyrics) is
designated by the © symbol; the sound recording's copyright is designated by the a
symbol. See id. §§ 401-02; see also LEAFFER, supra note 8, § 8.9.
10. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES,
880 (4th ed. 1993).
11. Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866
U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter Geneva Phonograms Convention].
12. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 344.
13. The United States and Japan joined this convention which became effective
March 10, 1974 and October 14, 1978 for each country, respectively. See KRASILOVSKY &
SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 519, 521. For a table of copyright agreements that the United
States has with foreign countries, see U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress,
International Copyright Relations of the United States, Copyright Office Circular 38a
(visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://Icweb.loc.gov/copyright/circs/circ38a>.
14. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 344-45.
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Berne's provisions were incompatible with U.S. Copyright Law. 15
The United State's resistance to conform was attributed to "a
perverse pride in the fact that we did it our way."'16 Originally, the
term of copyright lasted only twenty-eight years with a twenty-
eight year renewal opportunity. 17  The 1976 Copyright Act
extended this term to life of the author plus fifty years, the current
Berne standard.18 Both the 1909 and 1976 Acts had extensive
formalities, requiring registration, proper notice, and deposit of
copies for maximum protection.19 Finally, there was a concern
about the moral rights provisions contained within Berne, a
concept that is alien to U.S. Copyright law.20 In response,
Congress adopted only those measures necessary to join the Berne
Convention.
21
B. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Uraguay
Round's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS)
Because many questions were left open by the Berne
Convention, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations resulted in the TRIPs
agreement to provide a minimum level of copyright protection and
15. See Ralph Oman, The Impact of the Berne Convention on U.S. Copyright, 455
PLI/PAT 233,241 (1996).
16. I&
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (revised 1977).
18. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West 1998).
19. See 17 U.S.C §§ 11, 13, 19 (1909) (revised 1977); 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 401,402,405,407,
408 (West 1998).
20. See Oman, supra note 15, at 242-43; LEAFFER, supra note 8, § 12.4, at 378. Berne
Convention art. 6 bis defines moral rights in part as:
(1) Independently of an author's economic rights and even after the
transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry
of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where the
protection is claimed ....
I&. § 8.27, at 275 n.308.
21. See Oman, supra note 15, at 243. Moral rights are currently encoded in 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A (1998).
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enforcement consistent with the 1971 text of Berne.22 The two key
features of TRIPs include national treatment and Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status.23 National treatment requires all member
countries to give works from foreign authors the same degree of
copyright protection that country would give its own authors.
24
Most Favored Nation treatment is a trade incentive, requiring that
"any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by a party to
the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other WTO
members." 25  Pertaining to phonorecords, Article 14 of TRIPs
requires protection against pirated sound recordings from all the
member countries for fifty years.
26
In the recent past, this agreement created hostility between
the United States and Japan.27 Through the WTO, U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor, threatened Special 301 trade
sanctions 28 against Japan if it did not increase copyright protection
for U.S. authors to parallel that given to domestic Japanese
authors.29  Japan finally responded in February of 1997 by
protecting sound recordings made before 1971 by foreign authors
for the full fifty years as prescribed by the Berne Convention for
musical works.
30
The U.S. recording industry had good reason to complain
about lack of copyright protection in Japan. Piracy in Asia has
been blamed for slumping international sales of sound
22. See The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81.
23. See LEAFFER, supra note 8, § 12.10, at 396.
24. See id. § 12.3, at 373.
25. Id. § 12.10, at 396.
26. See Lionel S. Sobel, Retroactive Copyright Protection for Recordings, Japanese
Style: An American Diplomatic Triumph... Complete With Anomalies and Ironies, 18
ENT. L. REP. 4 (1997).
27. See Lorraine Wellert, U.S. Charges Japan with Musical Piracy, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1996, at D7.
28. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 345. The office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR), under Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade Act, can
place foreign countries that are determined to be deficient in providing protection for U.S.
intellectual property rights on a priority watch list. If the country does not adequately
respond within six months, trade sanctions can be imposed. See idt
29. See US. to Take Japan Case to WTO, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at D14.
30. See Suzanne M. Easter, Japan to Expand Copyright Protection for U.S. Sound
Recordings, Feb. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, Hot Topics Library, Int'l Law File.
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
recordings. 31 Even the Japanese recording industry itself realized
that more protection was needed against piracy of phonorecords.
32
In 1994 alone, the United States suffered losses of over $1.265
billion due to intellectual property piracy in Japan.
33
Undoubtedly, Japan realized its own important self-interest in
stronger protection for intellectual property because their
corporations' copyrightable and patentable products were also
subject to widespread piracy.
34
Special 301 threats appear to have been a very effective tool
for the USTR in gaining concessions for increased copyright
protection abroad.35  This device should be used carefully,
however, especially when dealing with developed nations such as
Japan.36 Frequently, what the United States perceives as a lack of
copyright protection for intellectual property is seen by Japan as
adequate coverage when compared to other nations.37  To
illustrate, The United States' demand for protection of pre-1971
sound recordings actually conflicts with the TRIPs goal of national
treatment.38 Furthermore, the United States currently protects
only those sound recordings made by Japanese authors since 1962,
whereas Japan protects sound recordings by U.S. authors made
since 1947.39 These inconsistencies illustrate how use of the
31. See Slump in '96 Int'l Music Sales Could Be Piracy Related, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS,
Oct. 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 584484.
32. See Japan Recording Group Wants More Safeguards Against Piracy, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS, Nov. 6, 1996.
33. See Eric H. Smith, Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the TRIPs Agreement,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559, 562 (1996). The exact figures for losses in musical
recordings for Japan was not available, but its neighboring country, China, was estimated
to cause $345 million in loses. See id
34. See Edward J. Fitzpatrick & Heidi C. Chen, Licensing in Asia, 454 PLI/PAT 381,
387 (1996).
35. See Smith, supra note 33, at 560-61. One story involved concerns about copyright
protection in the Dominican Republic. Under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act, the USTR prohibited importation of bananas from the Dominican Republic.
Bananas are the Dominican Republic's cash crop. The deleterious economic effects of the
ban resulted in increased protection and enforcement of copyright laws in the Dominican
Republic. See Lorin Brennan, International Copyright Conflicts, 17 WHITrIER L. REV.
203,205 (1995).
36. See Brennan, supra note 35, at 205.
37. See Sobel, supra note 26, at 4.
38. See id. at 5.
39. See idt Further, the United States only began protecting sound recordings in 1972
whereas Japan has done so since 1934. Professor Sobel.claims that Japan does not have a
real basis to complain about the lack of protection of pre-1962 Japanese recordings
because the number of unauthorized recordings of Japanese artists made in the United
336 [Vol. 21:331
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Special 301 threat can produce offensive nationalism.
III. THE AMERICAN COPYRIGHT PHILOSOPHY AS IT PERTAINS TO
SOUND RECORDINGS
Sound recordings have only enjoyed federal copyright
protection in the United States for slightly over twenty-seven
years.4° Section 101 of The Copyright Act of 1976 defines sound
recordings as "works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds." 41 This is to be distinguished
from a "phonorecord" or "phonogram," which is the physical
medium the work is embodied in (CD, DAT, vinyl, etc.)42 and the
underlying musical work-the composition of the song itself.4
3
A. Determining the Author of a Sound Recording
Under the Act, copyright ownership initially vests in the
"author" or "authors" of the work.44  It can be difficult to
determine which person(s) is the author of a sound recording
because the final product may involve input from not only the
musical artists but from the record producer, and sometimes, from
the record company itself.45 Because "[t]he 1976 Copyright Act
was not designed to establish the authorship or the resulting
States pales in comparison to the number of pirated U.S. recordings made in Japan. See
id. at 5-6.
40. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 38. Sounds recordings fixed and
published before February 15, 1972, may be protected by common law or state statute.
See id.
41. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998).
42. See id. The phonogram itself does not have copyright protection.
43. See LEAFFER, supra note 8, § 8.9, at 235. It is not necessarily easy to distinguish
between the sound recording and the musical composition it contains. Leaffer offers a
helpful example. A record company that owns a copyright in a sound recording of Irving
Berlin's White Christmas would only have a cause of action for infringement if someone
were to exactly duplicate the sound recording by direct copying without the record label's
permission. Anyone, after paying the statutory fee (or compulsory license, to be discussed
infra) could imitate, with their own musicians, that specific sound recording, much like the
ones used for television commercials. Irving Berlin, (or whoever owns the rights to White
Christmas) however, would have a cause of action for infringement of his reproduction,
performance, and adaptation rights if it were done without his permission (emphasis
added). See id. But see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), which held
that imitation of a unique voice by a "sound alike" constitutes copyright infringement,
despite defendant's purchase of a compulsory license.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1995).
45. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 39.
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ownership of the recordings," 46 authorship is usually left to the
parties involved to negotiate.
47
In order for a record label to maximize the rights that
copyright confers, almost all contracts between the record label
and a musical artist provide that the sound recordings the artist
produces are created for the record company as works for hire.
48
A work for hire is one prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment; or a work specially commissioned for
use as a contribution to a collective work, where the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work for hire.49 Following this logic,
the record company can then assert ownership either through an
expressly written clause or as an employer.
Despite the presence of such a contract, case law has not
dispositively determined whether these phonorecords are actually
works made for hire. There are two competing theories for
determining who is the author of a sound recording. One view
supports the rights of the person who "fixes" the work.50 This
approach tends to favor the musical artist as the author because it
is the artist who takes their music and words and "fixes the work in
a tangible medium of expression"5 1 when they record their songs.
The other view is that the person or entity that finances the
sound recording is the author entitled to ownership. 52 This
approach is consistent with the work for hire doctrine and would
tend to favor the record company because it is they who usually
invest the money to record the album through record advances
and salaries to the musical artist.53  Sometimes, the record
46. Id.
47. See id
4& See idt
49. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998).
50. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
51. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998).
52. See GORMAN & GINSBERG, supra note 10, at 246-47.
53. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730. In that case, the
court enumerated four factors courts should consider in making the determination of
whether a work was created by an employee within the scope of his or her employment:
(1) whether the hiring party retains the right to control the product; (2) whether the hiring
party actually wielded control with respect to the creation of the work; (3) by examining
the term "employee" as it pertains to common law agency law meaning; and (4) whether
the employee could be considered a "formally salaried" employee. See idL at 738-39
(emphasis added). A further examination of this case and its analysis reveals that items
such as the provision of benefits, the duration of the relationship between the parties, and
338 [Vol. 21:331
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company will also provide the recording facilities.
B. Limitations on the Rights of U.S Sound Recording Copyright
Holders
The author of the sound recording is more limited in their
ability to exercise exclusive rights than other classes of copyright
holders, including the owner of the underlying musical
composition.54 For example, the author of a sound recording must
allow anyone willing to pay the statutory fee to imitate the sound
recording.55 This is known as compulsory license. 56 A person
seeking to imitate the sound recording may adapt the arrangement
to conform to their style. They may not, however, change the
melody or fundamental character of the work so that it becomes a
derivative work,57 although they may obtain copyright in the new
sound recording.
The sound recording copyright holder is further limited by a
denial of performance right.58 This is important because when a
sound recording is played for commercial gain, as on a radio
station, the sound recording copyright holder is not entitled to any
fees.59 These royalties instead go to the owner of the underlying
musical composition.60
the source of the instrumentalities and tools used to create the work, are also important
considerations. Because there is usually a written agreement stating that a musical artist's
sound recording is a work for hire, this type of analysis is not usually relevant. If,
however, the recording contract does not so state, the employer/employee analysis tends
to favor the record labels.
54. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West 1998). Of course, there is a good chance that the
copyright owner of the underlying musical composition is also the author of the sound
recording.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1995).
56. See id. § 115(a)(1).
57. See iii § 115(a)(2). Notice the abundance of different recordings of the same
popular song, i.e., White Christmas. Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines a derivative work
as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement,... sound recording.., or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a derivative work." 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998) (emphasis added).
58. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(a) (West 1998).
59. See LEAFFER, supra note 8, § 8.24, at 271.
60. See idt Usually, a performance society such as ASCAP, BMI or SESAC collects
these fees from the licensing agency and distributes them to the owner of the musical
composition. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 10, at 512-15.
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It is inherently unfair to deny a sound recording copyright
holder the exclusive right of performance.61 Although it could be
argued that a sound recording lacks the quantitative creativity that
the underlying musical composition entails, the standard defined
by U.S. copyright case law is originality. 62  The process of
recording a song involves a number of creative decisions,
including, but not limited to: (i) what sound effects will be .used;
(ii) which instruments to highlight at different volumes; and (iii)
editing of the composition in terms of arrangement and length.
63
It is inconsistent to give a product like a book, which can be
essentially a report of facts, full rights of performance, 64 yet deny
one of the most publicly performed works, the sound recording,
the same right. Even in Japan, the sound recording is given a right
of performance. 65
C. Recording Contracts in the United States, Generally
It is not surprising in a society as litigious as ours, that a U.S.
recording contract will contain a baffling array of negotiation
points. 66 These contracts can reflect major issues such as how
many albums the artist will deliver to those topics that border on
the absurd. 67 The agreements can be hundreds of pages long as
the record company seeks to protect itself from types of situations
where they were hurt by the artist in the past.68
61. See generally Steven J. D'Onofrio, In Support of Performance Rights in Sound
Recordings, 29 UCLA L. REV 168 (1981).
62. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1990).
63. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 39.
64. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4) (West 1998).
65. See Japanese Copyright Act art. 22 (1990) reprinted in Mitsue Dairaku, Copyright
Protection in Japan (II), JAPAN Bus. L. LETTER, Feb. 1990, at 6, 8; see also Japan
Copyright Office, Copyright System in Japan, (visited Apr. 13, 1999)
<http://www.cric.or.jp/circ-e/ecsij>.
66. See generally Gerald A. Margolis, Counseling Clients in the Entertainment
Industry-Sound Recording-Basic, 479 PLI/PAT. 529 (1997) (showing an example of a
Warner Brothers recording contract).
67. One artist went so far as to require that there be a bowl of M&Ms with the brown
ones removed after their concert performances! See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 342 (1997).
68. See generally Margolis, supra note 66; see also PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 120.
One such issue could be when a key member of a group leaves. See Margolis, supra note
66, at 593-94.
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1. Length of Service
For a new musical artist, U.S. record companies try to avoid
committing to an act that might not sell enough records to warrant
a continued financial investment. Even worse, however, would be
to lose the rights to an act that becomes a venerable, multi-
platinum seller. To resolve this paradox, the record company will
usually only commit to a small number of releases (one or two)
that they guarantee the artist will be paid for, but reserve the
option to order eight to ten more.69 More established artists may
receive guarantees for a higher number of releases.
70
This is not to be confused with the term of the contract. The
term of the agreement is how long a record company keeps an
artist under exclusive contract to make albums for that company.
71
Originally, these terms were stated in a period of years in which
the artist was obligated to deliver the contracted amount of
product, with options to renew for additional terms.
72
Problems arise in using a term of years.73 Artists frequently
do not deliver their material on time. Some artists fail to meet
their deadlines because of the distractions that life as a celebrity
incurs. Others may be afraid to follow a wildly successful release
with a mediocre compilation.74 For example, Olivia Newton-John
successfully sued to be released from her contract with MCA
records after the agreed upon five year period.75 Unfortunately
for MCA, she had not delivered the total number of albums she
had contracted to complete. Frank Zappa illustrated the inverse
69. See PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 116-22.
70. See id. at 122-23.
71. See id. at 119-20.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 120.
74. See id. For example, the world-renown heavy metal act, Metallica, took six years
to release their latest album after their multi-million selling self-titled release. It is
interesting to see how long it takes for today's newer artists to follow up successful debuts.
Alanis Morisette is one such example. Her album, Jagged Little Pill became the biggest
selling debut ever, an estimated 16,000,000 copies sold to date. See Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), Gold & Platinum Database (visited Apr. 13, 1999)
[hereinafter RIAA] <http://www.riaa.com/goldplat/search.htm>. After a three-year
hiatus, she finally released Supposed Former Infatuation Junkie, which has sold only
3,000,000 copies to date, See id. The group who previously held the record for a debut
was Hootie & the Blowfish, whose Cracked Rear View Mirror sold over 15,000,000 copies.
Many considered their follow up, Fairweather Johnson to be released too early, selling a
"disappointing" 3,000,000 copies. See id.
75. See MCA Records, Inc. v. Olivia Newton-John, 90 Cal. App. 3d 18 (1979).
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of this problem. Zappa went to his label, Warner Brothers, with
four albums of compiled songs.76 Zappa claimed he had fulfilled
his contract and was now free to sign elsewhere. 77
In response to the previous lessons, record companies today
rarely use exact time periods.78 Instead, they usually provide that
each period ends six to nine months after the delivery of the latest
release and that there will be a minimum amount of time that must
pass before each new album can be recorded. 79 This allows the
record company to develop the artist through radio promotion and
touring. 80 It also ensures that the label can withdraw from the deal
if they suddenly find that their artist is no longer economically
viable. 8
1
The California Legislature addressed this concern by limiting
personal service contracts to a length of seven years. 82 Thus, a
recording artist who signs their agreement in California can be
released from their contract after that amount of time has passed,
assuming there is no choice of law clause for a different state
contained therein. New York has not addressed this idea with
legislation, but its courts look to see if the restraints are
"unreasonable and harsh" to the artists. 83
2. Royalties and Record Advances
Musical artists initially receive payment for their services
through money advances against royalties for sales of albums.84
The record advance may be used by the artist to pay for recording
costs, living expenses, video expenses and concert touring.85 The
size of the advance largely depends on the status of the musical
76. See PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 122.
77. See it
78. See id.; see also KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 9.
79. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 8; see also PASSMAN, supra note
67, at 122.
80. See PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 122.
81. See id.
82. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1989); see also KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL,
supra note 4, at 9; Michael I. Yanover & Harvey G. Kotler, Artist/Management
Agreements and the English Music Trilogy: Another British Invasion?, 9 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 211,232 (1989).
83. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 9.
84. See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES § 8.3.1, at 562 (3d ed. 1996).
85. See id.
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artist and the size of the contracting record label.86 Ranges per
album can be from $5,000 for an unknown artist signing to a small
independent label to $18,000,000 for megastars like Michael
Jackson.
87
As discussed in the previous section, a recording artist is at
the mercy of the record label's fickle disposition on how long to
keep the artist. Because the label stands to reap great financial
sums should an artist become a hit act, especially if they are
contracted to receive only a small initial record advance, the artist
should have their attorney negotiate a sliding scale for future
record advances.
88
A record advance is not necessarily money in the artist's
pocket; it is more like taking a loan from a bank.89 The money
advanced to the artist to make the sound recording is recouped
from future sales of albums against the artist's royalty rate.90
Ideally, an artist with a ten percent royalty rate and a
$100,000 record advance would need to sell 100,000 records at a
$10 per album to break even with their record label.91 The fine
points of a U.S. recording agreement, however, make this
calculation improbable. 92 The artist is expected to pay for the
producer's royalty from their own royalty percentage, typically
three to five percent.93 In addition, the artist will be generally
responsible for one-half the cost of video production and
independent promotion. 94
86. See PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 111-12.
87. See id.; see also BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 84, § 8.3.1, at 562.
88. See PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 113-14. Thus, as album sales reach a certain
level, (usually in increments of 100,000 units) the advance for future releases should also
increase. See id.
89. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 4, at 329.
90. See PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 101. Royalty percentages (from the retail price of
the album) range from nine percent for newer artists to twenty percent for artists like
Michael Jackson. See id. at 109. This rate decreases for foreign sales in most recording
contracts. See id. at 166-68.
91. Passman gives an example of a 14% royalty, $200,000 advance and sales of
500,000 units at $10.98 per unit. Despite such high sales, he concludes the artist would
only earn about $60,000! See id. at 114-15.
92. See id. at 114-15.
93. This is known as "all in." See id. at 110-11.
94. See id at 114; see also Lionel S. Sobel, Recording Artist Royalty Calculations:
Why Gold Records Don't Always Yield Fortunes (2d ed.), 12 ENT. L. REP. 3 (1990),
reprinted in BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 563.
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Recoupment for the artist is also hindered by what is known
as the "free goods" factor.95 Instead of selling a record store 100
albums at $8.50 per album, the record label (or distributor) sells
the retailer eighty-five albums at $10.00 each and gives the store 15
"free" albums.96 The record label still receives the same amount
($850), but the artist cannot recoup royalties on the fifteen free
albums. Under this system, the artist must sell more albums to
break even.97 An artist should have their counsel put a ceiling on
the amount of free goods allocated when negotiating their contract
with the record label, otherwise there is a potential for abuse,
forcing the artist to sell more records before any proceeds will be
paid.98
As suggested supra, to avoid a record label's initial advantage
over the musical artist, the artist's counsel should negotiate a
sliding scale for royalties. 99 This is more beneficial to the artist
than the advance sliding scale because the artist will see immediate
returns, instead of having to wait for future releases.
100
IV. JAPANESE COPYRIGHT PHILOSOPHY
Japan generates a tremendous amount of intellectual
property, although the majority comes in the form of technology
patents. 10 1 Japanese musical works have more limited worldwide
appeal, perhaps due to language barriers, but have seen a large
increase in demand in other Asian nations.10 2 It is also important
to note that large Japanese companies, such as Sony, have
acquired significant interests in U.S. musical compositions, which
enjoy widespread popularity in Japan.10 3 With this in mind, one
95. See PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 93-96.
96. These dollar figures are used for illustrative purposes only. See id. at 94-95.
97. See id. at 94. Even if one has a superstar royalty rate of twenty percent, twenty
percent of $0 = $0. It is industry custom to give away about fifteen percent of all units.
This also includes promotional copies given to radio stations and the press. See id
98. See Richard C. Wolfe, Negotiating and Litigating Music Royalties, 69 FLA. B.J. 56,
57-58 (Jan. 1995).
99. See id. at 58; see also PASSMAN, supra note 67, at 119.
100. See Wolfe, supra note 98, at 58. These increases are known as "sales bumps" and
usually indicate an increase of one percent in royalty for each 250,000 albums sold. See id
101. See Dan Rosen & Cikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual
Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32,33 (1994).
102. See Joseph Sofer et al., Asian Technology Update, 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 33, 34
(1994).
103. See Rosen & Usui, supra note 101, at 55, 62.
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would think Japan would favor strong copyright laws.104
Compared to the United States, however, "the Japanese version of
intellectual property law is porous and the attitude is often
ambivalent.
'"105
In the United States, copyright law exists to give a creative
monopoly on a sound recording so that an individual may exploit
their works as a property right.10 6  By beginning with the
individual, it is thought to "promote the progress of science and
the useful arts." 10 7 Japan's copyright law, in contrast, seeks to
"maximize efficiency, productivity and the common good rather
than isolating and rewarding the occasional star." 10 8 Under this
notion, "Japanese copyright law, like Japanese society, considers
the interactions of individuals and the society simultaneously and
values the correlative responsibilities at least as highly as the
individual rights." 10 9
A. Copyright Protection for Sound Recordings in Japan
Although article 10(1) of The Japanese Copyright Act of 1970
does not explicitly state that sound recordings are eligible for
authorship, it does mention musical works.110 The "categorization
is to be applied liberally as merely setting forth examples of
protected works." 111 Further evidence that sound recordings are
protected by copyright came from a 1934 amendment to the then
existing copyright law.112 Under this amendment, U.S. authors of
sound recordings would be protected under neighboring rights.
113
As a member of the Convention for the Protection for the
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of
Their Phonograms (the Geneva Convention mentioned supra),
104. See id. at 33.
105. Id. at 33-34.
106. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 10, at 15.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
108. Pantea M. Garroussi, Technology Transfers to Japan:t Legal and Cultural
Frameworks, 26 COLO. LAW. 77 (Jan. 1997).
109. Rosen & Usui, supra note 101, at 36 (emphasis added).
110. See Mitusue Dairaku, Copyright Protection in Japan (I), JAPAN BUS. L. LETTER,
Jan. 1990, at 8.
111. Id.
112. See TERUO DoI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT-
LAW AND PRACrICE IN JAPAN 163 (1992).
113. See id. at 151.
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U.S. authors would receive sound recording protection. 114
B. Rental of Records in Japan
The Japanese Copyright Act is concerned with "due regard to
a just and fair exploitation of [sound recordings] to contribute to
the development of culture." 115 With this in mind, consider that
the average cost of a foreign compact disc in Japan ranges from
$24 to $30.116 It only costs about $3, however, to rent a copy of a
sound recording.117 To promote this cultural concern, Japan's
copyright law "generously allows an individual to make one copy
of a copyrighted work for his own personal use."
118
This allowance understandably infuriated U.S. record labels
and their artists because the only royalty paid to them would be
for the initial sale to the rental store, much like that for
videocassettes of movies in the United States. 119 Obviously, the
ability of the consumer to duplicate a rental unit meant a
tremendous loss in income for U.S. concerns. In 1992, the record
rental business was estimated to generate $600 million of
business.120  The Japanese Music Record Rental association
countered that most rental revenue only comes in the CD's first
month of release, and that the rental ban should be reduced in
length in exchange for higher copyright royalties.
121
Major revisions to the Japanese copyright law took effect on
January 1, 1992 to address this dispute. 122 The new law granted
foreign musical artists and manufacturers exclusive rights for one
114. See Mitsue Dairaku, Copyright Protection in Japan (IV), JAPAN Bus. L. LETTER,
Apr.-May, 1990, at 11-12. Article 8 of Japan's Copyright Act does not use the term
"sound recording" but instead uses "phonograms" and "producers of phonograms." The
cited article was published before Japan had made some significant amendments to their
Copyright Act. The 1991 amendment and the language surrounding it ("instrumental and
vocal performances and recordings") seem to encompass sound recordings as defined by
U.S. copyright law. See DOI, supra note 112, at 153-54. For an updated English
translation of Japanese copyright law, see Japan Copyright Office website, supra note 65.
115. Rosen & Usui, supra note 101, at 35.
116. See id. at 62.
117. See id. at 61.
118. Id. at 62.
119. See id
120. See id at n.110; see also Steve McClure, Japan's Eventful Year Included Rental
Rein-In, BILLBOARD, Dec. 26, 1992, at 53.
121. See Foreign Producers Remain Firm on Japanese Rental Ban, 5 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS., May 1992, at 36.
122. See McClure, supra note 120, at 53.
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year to withhold their releases from the rental market. 123 After
that time, they "would be entitled to royalties for the use of their
products for commercial purposes, including rental.' 124 Of course,
U.S. companies would prefer that these limitations extended for
the life of the work. 125
The U.S. artists and labels have a valid concern here. When
Japan does not give rental prohibition rights to the author "for the
life of the work, they are not really granting reproduction rights
and are therefore outside of their international agreements."
126
Japan should give U.S. authors of sound recordings the full
protection against rental that an author receives in the United
States.12
7
In responding to the threatened Special 301 trade sanctions,
the Japanese may have felt that providing a one year rental-free
period for foreign authors would be adequate protection. This
policy is consistent with what Japanese domestic authors receive
and with their concern for society's ability to use a copyrighted
work.128 Arguably, the bulk of sales for a sound recording may
occur during the first year after its release. 129 The twelve-month
withholding period from the rental market would thus adequately
protect the copyright owner's economic interests for these sales.
A sound recording copyright owner, however, should be
entitled to the full royalty value of a record sale for the life of the
work in Japan. There are many reasons to justify this position.
Record rental shops in Japan generally pay a flat fee to the sound
recording copyright holder that amounts to less than the wholesale
price of one compact disc, regardless of how often the work is
rented.130  Considering that some records continue to sell
substantial numbers well after their initial release, the sound
recording copyright owner and the artist, are deprived of a
significant source of income (royalties).131
123. See id.
124. /d.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Under 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A), rental of sound recordings for profit is
prohibited without the permission of the copyright owner for the life of the work.
12& See DOI, supra note 112, at 166.
129. Cf Foreign Producers Remain Firm on Japanese Rental Ban, supra note 121.
130. See generally Easter, supra note 30.
131. Before the recent changes to Japanese copyright law, an estimated 6 million
unauthorized recordings from the pre-1971 period were made and sold annually in Japan,
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Timeless artists like Elvis Presley continue to have substantial
selling power in Japan.132 At the same time, newer artists
frequently develop into major acts, thus igniting an interest in their
previous works. Because the rental system in Japan would allow a
person to rent a copy of an older work and make a copy of it,
resulting in a decreased royalty, the twelve-month protection
period is inadequate.
1. Softening the Impact of Record Rental
To reduce lost sales through rental, U.S. sound recording
owners must to find a way to make the Japanese consumer want to
permanently retain their phonorecord. One novel approach that
has developed is to make the album's packaging unique.
Alternative rock acts The Red Hot Chili Peppers and Tool have
recently released compact discs with collectable packaging.133
Both releases sold over one million copies worldwide.
134
For this peerless packaging, the plastic compact disc cover is
slotted and the underlying artwork has been overlapped so that
when the package is tilted, the picture appears to be animated,
much like a hologram. The Tool CD jacket contains multiple,
albeit disturbing,135  images for the phonorecord owner's
amusement. Other possibilities to make the packaging collectable
are inserting posters and merchandise catalogues. These are
benefits that are unavailable for someone who rents a record and
copies it.
The Japanese legislature has recently provided some means to
lessen the financial impact of copying of sound recordings. 136 An
amendment to the Japanese copyright law established a tariff on
digital recording equipment, including blank tapes. 137 This tariff is
then distributed to Japanese collecting agencies (like JASRAC,
the Japanese equivalent of ASCAP) that then distribute the levy
costing U.S. industries an estimated $500 million in sales. See Easter, supra note 30.
132. See Paul Blustein, Jazz, Olidies Pirated by Japan, U.S. Complains, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Feb. 10, 1996, at C2.
133. See RED HOT CHILI PEPPERS, ONE HOT MINUTE (Warner Bros. Records 1995);
TOOL, AENIMA (Zoo Ent. 1996).
134. See RIAA, supra note 74.
135. Among the images (that can be printed here) is a satellite view of the western
United States that depicts California falling into the Pacific Ocean.
136. See Tsuneo Sato & Seiji Ohno, Entertainment Aspects of Japan's New Copyright
Law, 3 ENT. L. REP. 89 (1993).
137. See id. at 90.
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to U.S. collection agencies. 138 If the buyer of the digital recording
equipment can prove the copying is for private use, however, they
get the levy back. 139 The only real barrier to obtaining the refund
is reporting to the collecting agency designated by the Director-
General of the Cultural Affairs Agency.
14°
The tariff should be imposed against all buyers of digital
equipment, whether used for private use or commercial profit.
141
Theoretically, most record rental consumers will only make a copy
for their own use, thus entitling them to a perfect reproduction of
the rental copy via digital technology, the amendment is of little
consolation to sound recording copyright holders. These copyright
holders will still lose income, despite the twelve-month rental
withholding period for the reasons discussed supra.
Even the TRIPs agreement leaves sound recording copyright
owners undercompensated with regard to record rental in Japan.
Under TRIPs, Member States, such as Japan, who currently
subject rental of sound recordings to a system of equitable
remuneration, may continue this practice if this practice does not
materially impair the rightholder's exclusive right of
reproduction. 142 This exception was aimed at Japan, despite the
criticism "over its existing remuneration provisions as being
inequitable due to minimal charges on audio cassettes intended to
compensate for lost sales, or low fees paid by rental businesses."'1
43
V. LITIGATING JAPANESE RECORDING AGREEMENTS
Remarkably, a typical Japanese recording contract is short on
details. All the tireless provisions contained in U.S. recording
agreements are substituted with a general idea to cooperate in
good faith 144 or an application of an industry-wide standard.
145
138. See id. at 91.
139. See id at 90.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Alexander A. Caviedes, International Copyright Law: Should the European
Union Dictate its Development?, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 165,205 (1998).
143. Id. at 206. Record rental has also negatively impacted Japanese labels. Sales in
the huge CD singles market dropped from 23 million in 1996 to 17 million in 1997. A
spokesman from Recording Industry Association of Japan stated "[wie think one of the
reasons for the decline in million-sellers is increasing [mini-disc] penetration." Steve
McClure, Japan's CD Singles Market Hurt by MiniDisc, Rentals, BILLBOARD, March 14,
1998, available in 1998 WL 10913086.
144. See Rosen & Usui, supra note 101, at 59.
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For Japanese record labels, "[t]he glue that holds the contract
together is not the law but rather the relationship." 146 Many
Westerners have adopted the view that "litigation threatens a
fundamental Japanese concern for consensus and harmony." 147
Commentators within and outside of Japan "are almost unanimous
in attributing to the Japanese an unusual and deeply rooted
cultural preference for informal, mediated settlement of private
disputes and a corollary aversion to the formal mechanisms of
judicial adjudication.'
'148
Some authors assert, however, that it is a myth that the
Japanese are averse to litigation. 149 These commentators instead
feel that this notion can be attributed to the Japanese legal
process. 150 There are significant structural hurdles in the Japanese
system for civil litigation. Japan does not implement many of the
procedural and economic incentives that facilitate the decision to
litigate in the United States.15
1
To demonstrate, a Japanese litigant must pay high attorney
retainer and filing fees. The retainer fee in Japan corresponds to
the amount of damages claimed.152 This sliding scale is present, to
a certain extent, in the United States, but many U.S. attorneys will
accept a case for little or no money if the prospects for a favorable
judgement are good. Contingent fee arrangements in Japan are
not prohibited, but are rarely used because of its system of filing
fees.
145. See Steve McClure, Japan, The New Reality: Coping with the Crunch,
BILLBOARD, Sep. 26, 1998, at 117 (noting that the maximum royalty rate that Japanese
record labels give artists is 5 percent).
146. See Rosen & Usui, supra note 101, at 59.
147. J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement
Amounts and Verdict Rates In Japan, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS IN JAPAN 122, 124 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996).
148. John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, in COMPARATIVE LAW:
LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 108 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996).
149. See id.
150. See Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of
Litigation In Japan: A Structural Analysis, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE
LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 102 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996).
151. See id. at 107.
152. See id. at 105.
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In the United States, there is a flat filing fee of $150 in federal
district courts, regardless of the amount of damages claimed.153 In
Japan, the filing fee increases with the amount of damages alleged
in the complaint.154 For example, a complaint for $5 million (600
million yen at 120 yen per dollar) would cost $25,000 to file. 155
This amount may be too great for an attorney, recording artist, or
their label to risk. Lesser amounts of claimed damages would
mean a reduction in the filing fee calculation rate. A claim for
$25,000 would result in a more tolerable filing fee of $175.156
Thus, there is a strong incentive to limit the amount of damages
claimed in Japanese courts. It is not difficult to see the
attractiveness of mediating disputes in Japan. The Japanese
complaint system may be advantageous because it encourages
good faith, non-frivolous suits, but at the same time may deter
someone with a valid claim from pursuing their rights.
In a groundbreaking claim, the Japanese label, Taurus
Records, sued its best-selling artist, Chikako Sawada, for failing to
complete a record as expected. 157 Consistent with many Japanese
recording contracts, the number of albums and singles Sawada was
to compose for Taurus was not specified. 158 Taurus's practice was
to negotiate a yearly release schedule and marketing plan with
Sawada's manager. 159 Sawada felt her obligation to the label was
over when her contract ended in 1993.160
The record label's view, the traditional Japanese perspective,
was that specifically enumerated provisions were not necessary. 161
While record contracts in the United States are "negotiated at
arm's length, Japanese contracts are entered into with arms
linked."162
In an analogous case, Kawamato v. KK. Interface Project, the
Tokyo High Court held that the exclusive performance contract
between an entertainer and a production company could terminate
as provided in their contract, even though the production company
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1994).
154. See Yamanouci & Cohen, supra note 150, at 107.
155. See idt
156. See id
157. See Rosen & Usui, supra note 101, at 59.
158 See id.
159. See id
160. See id at 59-60.
161. See id
162- Id
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had invested a large amount of money to develop the entertainer's
talent.163 As in Sawada's case, the entertainer wished to be
released from a contract with their production company.
164
This case examined Article 14 of the Labor Standards Law,
which prohibits labor contracts for more than one year. 65 This
law could be an effective tool for a recording artist in Japan
because they could possibly abandon their contract if they were
unhappy with income and support.
Before the artist can opt out of their agreement after one
year, the contract must be determined to be a labor contract.
Under a labor contract, the employer must have the right to direct
and order the worker.166 Whether an exclusive performance
contract between an entertainer and their production company
falls under Article 14 will often depend on how established the
artist is.167 Establishment seems to correspond with selling power
and seniority.
According to the court opinion, an established artist will
frequently be seen as on equal footing with the employer, and is
thus deemed to be independent from their relationship with the
production company.168  If this is the case, the recording
agreement would not be considered a labor contract and the one-
year limitation would not apply.
The prospective artist would be more likely to be considered
a party to a labor contract because it is less likely that they are
established, and thus lack bargaining power. 169 This would be an
effective tool for the new music artist who experiences immediate
success in Japan, but desires a better deal in terms of record
advances and royalties. After one year, that artist could
conceivably leave their label in search of a more favorable
agreement.
163. See 1 Tokyo High Court, 30 June 1993, The Hanreijiho 1467-68 cited in Tsuneo
Sato & Toshiyuki Fukai, Period of Contract Between an Entertainer and a Production
Company: Nobuhiro Kawamoto v. K.K. Interface Project, 6 ENT. L. REP. 244 (1995).
164. See generally, Intellectual Property Rights In Asia, 28 INT'L REV. OF INDUST.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 408 (June 1997).
165, See Sato & Fukai, supra note 163, at 244.
166. See id. at 245.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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An interesting question remains, however. What about the
U.S. music artist who once enjoyed success in the United States,
but is new to Japan? Would they be considered established or
prospective in Japan? The answer would probably depend on the
amount of sales the artist previously generated in Japan and
whether they had prior agreements with Japanese music entities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Berne and Geneva Conventions were a good beginning
to predictable international treatment of sound recordings. As this
Comment has shown, however, different cultural attitudes towards
copyright in sound recordings have left open many gaps. Special
301 trade sanctions and threats have proved an excellent vehicle
for U.S. ideals, but should not be used recklessly.
Although Special 301 threats may force Western copyright
views upon Japan, more importantly, the United States' cultural
influence on Japanese society will cause changes in Japanese
recording contracts. As Japanese musical artists become more
international, their expectations will change. Japanese labels
would be wise to be more explicit in their requirements when
drafting recording agreements. There is evidence that some
Japanese record labels are beginning to adopt this view. Sony
Music Entertainment Japan President Shigeo Maruyama stated he
wanted the label to move toward an American style of record
production. 170 By this he means a system where "the artists,
producers and record companies share both rewards and risks on a
more equitable basis than the system that now prevails in
Japan." 171  Maruyama may have been inspired to bring about
change to the Japanese label system in light of the departure of
Dreams Come True, Sony's biggest act in a "move that shocked
the Japanese music business."
172
At the same time, U.S. sound recording copyright holders
should demand more of U.S. and Japanese copyright law. The
U.S. should grant a performance right to sound recordings, as
Japan allows. Additionally, the sound recording artist should hope
170. See McClure, supra note 145, at 117.
171. Id. For example, the maximum artist royalty rate in Japan is only 5 percent,
which is extremely low compared to other countries. See id, This reflects the higher
amount of risk that Japanese record labels maintain than their American counterparts.
172. Steve McClure, Japanese Biz Regroups Under Economic Woes, BILLBOARD, Dec.
27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12792730.
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that record rental restrictions will continue to increase in Japan.
Until this practice is eliminated, artists and labels alike stand to
lose windfalls.
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